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THE IMPACT OF MOLIEN v. KAISER
FOUNDA TION HOSPITALS: NEW
CONSEQUENCES FOR OLD ACTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1980, the California Supreme Court allowed a negli-
gence cause of action based solely on emotional distress, without ac-
companying physical injury. This decision, Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals,' marked a change in existing California law and
extended the right to sue in two areas. The court first abolished the
long-standing requirement of physical injury contemporaneous with
the negligently-caused mental distress. In addition, the mere unreason-
able risk of mental or emotional distress was deemed sufficient, in itself,
to be tortious conduct. In analyzing the Molien decision, it is necessary
to first trace the historical background of the mental distress torts.
Molien can then be placed in perspective and the question of whether
California is now subjecting a negligent tortfeasor to the spectre of un-
limited liability can be answered.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Mrs. Valerie Molien underwent a routine physical examination at
the Kaiser Foundation Hospital. During this examination, one of the
hospital staff physicians negligently examined and tested her which re-
sulted in an erroneous diagnosis of infectious syphilis. She was told to
advise her husband, Stephen, of the diagnosis. As requested by the
physician, Stephen Molien underwent the required blood tests to deter-
mine whether he might be the source of his wife's disease. His test
results were negative. Subsequently, given what the Moliens believed
to be "reliable evidence of a particularly noxious infidelity,"2 Valerie
became increasingly suspicious. Tensions arose between husband and
wife. Valerie began proceedings to dissolve the marriage and the
Moliens were forced to seek marital counseling.
1. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
2. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
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Upon discovering that the diagnosis was incorrect, plaintiff Ste-
phen Molien sued the staff physician and Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
stating two causes of action: the negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress upon himself as husband, and the loss of consortium occasioned
by the negligent diagnosis. The trial court sustained general demurrers
to both causes of action and dismissed the case.
B. Issues Presented to the California Supreme Court
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reevaluated the long-
standing requirement of a physical injury for claims of both the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. In so
doing, the court concentrated on two questions: first, whether a hus-
band could recover for the negligent infliction of emotional distress,
unaccompanied by physical injury, due to the erroneous diagnosis of
his wife's illness as syphilis; and second, whether he could also recover
for loss of consortium, absent physical injury to his wife.
III. RECOVERY FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TORTS
PRIOR TO MOLIEN
Courts in the United States traditionally have refused to impose
liability for the infliction of mental distress.' Judicial steps toward the
protection of mental and emotional interests have proceeded at vastly
different rates and with a staggering array of approaches, definitions
and tests designed to meet the objections made to the recognition of
this intangible interest.4 Courts still attempt to justify pro-plaintiff de-
cisions in order to allay the traditional fears surrounding mental dis-
tress recovery: the opening of litigation floodgates;' the ease with
which such claims might be feigned;6 and the exposure of defendants to
3. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 66, 60 N.E. 674, 675 (1901); Smith
v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 174 Mass. 576, 55 N.E. 380 (1899); Bohlen, Right to Recoverfor iyury
Resultingfrom Negligence Without Impact, 41 AM. L. REG. 141 (1902); Note, The Right to Mental
Security, 16 FLA. L. REV. 540, 541-54 (1964).
4. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49-50 (4th ed.
1971); Rohlen, supra note 3, at 143-46; Brody, Neglgent Inflicted Psychic Injuries.- A Return to
Reason, 7 VILL. L. REv. 232 (1962).
5. See, e.g., Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chouteau, 28
Okla. 664, 115 P. 879 (1911); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966) (the causal
relationship between tortfeasor's negligence and claimant's emotional distress cannot be medically
determined); Medlin v. Allied Invest. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1966).
6. See, e.g., Morgan v. Hightower, 291 Ky. 58, 163 S.W.2d 21 (1942); Spade v. Lynn &
B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897); Bennett v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 549 P.2d 393
(Okla. App. 1976). Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905); Summer-
field v. Western U. Tel. Co., 87 Wis. 1, 57 N.W. 973 (1894).
[Vol. 16:783
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potentially unlimited liability.7 In addition, legal protection of peace of
mind has been characterized as being merely "litigation in the field of
bad manners . . . better dealt with by instruments of social control."'
Therefore, courts have sought to place restrictions on emotional distress
recovery.9
Many American jurisdictions have retained the requirement of a
physical injury either causing or caused by the mental distress in the
hope that objectively-manifested physical symptoms will guard against
feigned claims and floodgate litigation.'0 A review of cases in these
jurisdictions, however, produces a strained myriad of purported "phys-
ical" injuries, often no more than a trivial peg on which a favored
plaintiff can hang a mental distress claim."
Given an immediate physical injury, plaintiffs have had little diffi-
culty in securing recovery for accompanying psychological injury
through the vehicle of "parasitic" damages. 2 Plaintiffs have also
7. See Ward v. West Jersey & S.R. Co., 65 N.J.L. 383,47 A. 61 (1900); Mitchell v. Roches-
ter Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,45 N.E. 354 (1896); Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 A.C. 222 (1888).
8. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1035 (1936). See also Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis, and Law, 6
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 428, 439 (1957).
9. THE RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 46, Comment c (1934) states:
The interest in mental and emotional tranquility and, therefore, in freedom from
mental and emotional disturbance is not, as a thing in itself, regarded as of sufficient
importance to require others to refrain from conduct intended or recognizably likely to
cause such a disturbance. Conduct, either of act or omission, which is intended or likely
to cause only mental or emotional distress is not tortious.
But see note 18, infra, for the change of heart evinced by the 1948 RESTATEMENT.
10. Eg., Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Green v. T.A. Shoe-
maker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 (1909); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Keiffer, 48 Okla. 434, 150 P.2d
1026 (1915); Harned v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
11. See, e.g., Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd. v. Whitlock, 199 Ark. 820, 136 S.W.2d 184
(1940) (conductor taking plaintiff's arm to eject her from bus); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App.
647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973) (nine months of depression and withdrawal from social life); Daley v.
LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) (traumatic neurosis and nervous upset); Bedenk v.
St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1955) (bruise as the physical basis for an eight
thousand dollar verdict); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of
smoke); Thompson v. Minnis, 201 Okla. 154, 202 P.2d 981 (1949) (hunger caused by twenty-four
hour lack of food). But see, e.g., Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D.C. Del. 1965) (mild
headaches, nervousness and dizziness not sufficient).
12. Recovery for emotional distress has been allowed where it was the result of, or "para-
sitic" to, a violation of a legal right for which other damages were recoverable, most often, the
infliction of a physical injury. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967) (mental suffering constitutes an element of damages when it follows from the
conduct complained of); Denco Bus Lines v. Hargis, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d 560 (1951) (recovery
allowed for nervousness and bodily pain caused by bus collision). Such status has often been the
predecessor to full recognition: "The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor
belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is today recognized as
parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability." I. STREET,
THE FOUNDATION OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
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maintained their ability to recover when mental distress has been the
result of an independent tort such as assault,13 false imprisonment, 14 or
where the plaintiff owed the defendant a special duty. t5
Until the recognition of the right to recover for the negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, recovery for psychological injury without
physical manifestation had been limited to its intentional infliction, as
in the 1920 case of Nickerson v. Hodges, 6 decided by the Louisiana
Supreme Court. The defendants had buried a container of dirt in the
backyard of the plaintiff, an elderly and mentally infirm woman. Tell-
ing her of the "pot of gold," they encouraged her to dig it up and
watched as she carried it off to city hall. There, she opened it in front
of a laughing crowd, discovered the prank, and was publicly humili-
ated. The outrageous nature of the defendants' conduct gave credibil-
ity to her later claim of embarrassment and the court allowed recovery.
Other jurisdictions began to rely on the existence of intentional,
extreme conduct as an assurance of the genuineness of an emotional
distress claim.' 7 The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopted this posi-
tion in 1948, and extended the cause of action to include both inten-
tional and reckless conduct.' 8 Even with the recognition of intentional
infliction of mental distress as an independent tort, recovery could still
be predicated on a showing of physical consequences or other in-
dependent tort basis. 19 Jurisdictions adopting the present Restatement,
however, do not require a physical manifestation or injury if the inten-
tional conduct is directed toward the plaintiff or his immediate fam-
13. See, e.g., Holdorfv. Holdorf, 185 Iowa 838, 169 N.W. 737 (1918); Trogdon v. Terry, 172
N.C. 540, 90 S.E. 583 (1916).
14. See, e.g., Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925); Salisbury v.
Poulson, 51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918).
15. One of the most typical relationships being that of common carrier and passenger. See,
eg., Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Bell, 166 Ky. 400, 179 S.W. 400 (1915). For other relationships
giving rise to a special duty, see Dunn v. Western U. Tel. Co., 2 Ga. App. 845, 59 S.E. 189 (1907)
(telegraph company and customer); Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing Store, Inc., 137 F. Supp.
764 (D.C.S.C. 1956). But see Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958)
(no special duty owed to business invitees such as supermarket customer).
16. 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920).
17. E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952); See
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MicH. L. REv. 874 (1939).
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1948): "(1) One who by extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
harm."
19. See Fisher v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 214 N.W. 310 (1927) (false imprisonment as in-
dependent tort); Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954) (headache,
indigestion and loss of sleep, sufficient physical manifestations).
[Vol. 16:783
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ily. ° Nevertheless, where the defendant's intentional or reckless
conduct has not been such that "an average member of the community
...would exclaim, 'Outrageous' "21 courts have been extremely reluc-
tant to impose liability.22
Given the fears surrounding mental distress recovery in general,
and only the traditional duty-foreseeability measure for a negligent de-
fendant's conduct, courts have devised various "tests" by which to eval-
uate distress claims. Designed to serve as safeguards against unlimited
liability, they have often formed impenetrable barriers to otherwise
worthy plaintiffs.2 3 The most common approaches have been the im-
pact rule,24 the zone of danger test25 and, most recently, the Dillon fore-
seeability test.26
A. Impact Rule
Under the impact rule, the mentally-distressed plaintiff must show
an actual physical invasion to recover for its negligent infliction. 7 No
recovery is allowed, therefore, if the physical injury is merely the prod-
uct of the emotional distress. In Bosley v. Andrews,28 the plaintiff suf-
fered a heart attack while running from the defendant's bull. Viewing
the heart attack as merely the result of her being frightened, the court
denied recovery. Had there been some intermediate physical conse-
quence, such as her falling, which could have been targeted as the
cause of the attack, recovery might have been granted.
Without the requisite contemporaneous impact, even severe
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2)(a) (1965).
21. Id. at Comment d.
22. See Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344, 347 (1961) ("actions ... of such a
nature as to be considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality"); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 54, at 327. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 312, Comment b, which would allow a negligence cause of
action where the defendant's conduct has been unreasonably risky only if bodily harm or injury
results from such conduct.
23. See Comment, The Development of Recoveryfor Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress Aris-
ingfrom Peril or Injury to Another: An Analysis of the American and Australian Approaches, 26
EMORY L.J. 647 (1977).
24. See generally Brody, supra note 4, at 238-46; Comment, Recoveryfor Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress: Changing the Impact Rule in Indiana, 54 IND. L.J. 467 (1979).
25. See notes 32-39 supra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 40-47 supra and accompanying text.
27. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "there can be no recovery for the consequences
of fright and shock negligently inflicted in the absence of contemporaneous impact." Whetham v.
Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972).
28. 393 Pa. 161, 142 A.2d 263 (1958).
1981]
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psychic injuries have been precluded entirely from compensation. 29 To
remedy the injustice done to worthy plaintiffs, the courts have often
strained to find "impacts" in implausible situations. Just as with the
requirements of a "physical" injury, however, these semantical games
have led to confusion and inconsistency, and only a minority of Ameri-
can jurisdictions continues to apply the impact rule.3'
B. Zone of Danger Test
Due to the problems of the impact rule, some courts began to al-
low recovery where the defendant's negligent conduct merely placed
the plaintiff in fear of an actual impact, rather than requiring the im-
pact itself. This variation, known as the "zone of danger" test,32 was
adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts 33 and is the prevailing
view of the majority of American jurisdictions in the United States. 4
This test grafts on to mental distress cases the theory of duty espoused
in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad35 and requires plaintiffs to show
29. E.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896) (citing lack of
impact, the court denied recovery to a formerly pregnant plaintiff who had suffered a miscarriage
as a result of defendant's runaway horses halting just on either side of her head).
30. In a bizarre but now famous case, impact was found where defendant's horse "evacuated
his bowels" onto the plaintiffs lap. Christy Bros. v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680
(1928). See also Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (plaintiff suffered no
physical injury in traffic accident, yet fainted while taking the defendant's name, suffering a skull
fracture as a result).
31. See Garber v. United States, 578 F.2d 414 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric
Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (D.C. Ark. 1959) (injury or impact may be constructive); Fried-
man v. Mutual Broadcasting Sys., 380 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. App. 1980); Howard v. Bloodworth, 137
Ga. App. 478, 224 S.E.2d 122 (1976); Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons, Northwest, 100 Idaho 840,
606 P.2d 944 (1980); Kaiserman v. Bright, 377 N.E. 261 (Ill. App. 1978); Kroger Co. v. Beck, -
Ind. App.,--, 375 N.E.2d 640 (1978); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Roberts, 207 Ky. 310, 269 S.W. 333
(1925); Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 396 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1965).
32. This doctrine was expounded in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295,
379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), overruled, Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69
Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965):
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) has no application to illness or bodily harm of
another which is caused by emotional distress arising solely from harm or peril to a third
person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to the other.
34. See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); McGovern v. Piccolo, 33
Conn. Supp. 225, 372 A.2d 989 (1976); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709
(1965); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552
(Minn. 1980); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry
Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12 (1969);
Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
35. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928): "[The orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of
reasonable vigilance would be the orbit of the duty." Id at 349, 162 N.E. at 100. Without foresee-
ability of harm to the person injured, there can be no duty and, therefore, no negligence with
6
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themselves to have been within a zone of foreseeable personal physical
danger to establish their claims for mental distress recovery. So long as
the plaintiff is within this zone, suffers mental distress and some physi-
cal manifestation of that distress, a cause of action may be maintained
for the witnessing of danger or injury to another. Zone of danger pro-
ponents justify the use of the test on foreseeability grounds, asserting
that a defendant who places the plaintiff in fear of impact or physical
injury must certainly anticipate emotional distress as a proximate con-
sequence of his negligent conduct.3 6 The leading case in this area is
Waube v. Warrington.
In Waube, a husband attempted to recover for the death of his
wife. Through the window of their home, the wife had seen a negligent
driver strike and kill her daughter. She died from the emotional shock
of witnessing this accident. The court, relying on Palsgraf,38 found the
wife to have been outside the zone of danger and denied recovery. Her
lack of physical proximity rendered her presence unforeseeable to the
reasonable man and, as such, the defendant owed her no duty.
39
C. The Foreseeability Test.- Dillon v. Legg
The zone of danger test has had its greatest application in third
party-bystander cases4" and its greatest criticism in Dillon v. Legg.4
Dillon broadened the zone of danger from that area whose inhabitants
were exposed to physical injury to encompass those exposed to mental
or emotional injury,42 otherwise known as the "zone of fright."43
The facts of Dillon were similar to many of the bystander cases
decided under the traditional zone of danger approach. Young Erin
Dillon was run over by a negligent driver as her mother and sister
watched nearby. Both mother and sister sued the driver for their shock
regard to that person. Justice Cardozo, for the majority, limited a defendant's liability to those
individuals within the zone of danger, those fearing for their own safety.
36. J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 15.06 at 315 (1977). See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 143
(1959).
37. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. 216 Wis. at -, 258 N.W. at 501.
40. See, e.g., Owens v. Childrens Memorial Hosp., 480 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1973) (applying
Nebraska law); Reed v. Moore, 156 Cal. App. 2d 43, 319 P.2d 80 (1957); Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon,
508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
41. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
42. Id. at 736 n.5, 441 P.2d at 920 n.5, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 n.5.
43. See Comment, A New Application of an Old Tort: Intentional Infliction ofMental Distress
Against Physicians and Hospitals, 83 DICK. L. REv. 243 (1979).
1981]
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and emotional distress. The trial court sustained a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings against the mother because she was not within a
zone of personal physical danger. The court denied a similar motion
against the sister, however, because of the possibility that she was in the
zone of danger. Mother and sister were only yards apart when the acci-
dent occurred, but that distance alone was allegedly enough to bar the
mother's claim. The California Supreme Court, citing the "hopeless
artificiality of the zone of danger rule," held that the mother's cause of
action was established, even though she was in no way physically en-
dangered nor put in fear for her own safety.'
Returning to traditional negligence concepts, the Dillon court
abolished the requirement of physical proximity as an absolute barrier
to recovery. Liability, according to Dillon, is to be imposed for those
injuries, including mental distress, which are reasonably foreseeable.45
Foreseeability is to be determined by three factors:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the acci-
dent as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it,
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional im-
pact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the
accident from others after its occurence. (3) Whether plaintiff
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an ab-
sence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship.46
Dillon did not address the question whether there must be a physi-
cal manifestation of the emotional injury, however. Because Mrs. Dil-
lon had suffered a physical injury as a result of her shock, the court
expressly confined its ruling to those cases in which physical injury was
present.47 Even as it did not establish an absolute rule of liability, the
foreseeability guidelines of Dillon provided a springboard for the reas-
sessment and reevaluation of the entire field of emotional distress
recovery.
44. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
45. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
46. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. For a novel, although unsuccessful
application of the second factor, see Burke v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (surviving twin sister of airplane crash victim denied recovery for emotional in-
jury sustained through her "extrasensory perception" of the accident).
47. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
[Vol. 16:783
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D. The Progeny of Dillon: Hawaii
Few jurisdictions outside California have adopted Dillon, either in
whole or in part,4" and some have directly criticized it.49 Hawaii both
accepted Dillon and went beyond it in Rodrigues v. State.5 0 In Rodri-
gues, the state negligently failed to maintain a drainage culvert which
caused the flooding of plaintiffs' home and their subsequent emotional
distress. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that independent legal pro-
tection should be given to the tort of negligent infliction of serious
mental distress and adopted the recovery standard as being: "where a
reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately
cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."51
Four years after this decision, Hawaii, in Leong v. Takasaki,52 dis-
carded the physical impact or injury requirement and also the need for
a blood relationship between plaintiff and victim. In both Rodrigues
and Leong, plaintiffs recovered for mental distress which was held to be
a reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's conduct. Having
eliminated all tests, rules and factors other than reasonable foreseeabil-
ity, Hawaii became the most liberal jurisdiction for emotional distress
recovery.
One year after Leong, however, the court feared that the Rodrigues
and Leong decisions might come to stand for the proposition that de-
fendants owed a duty of care to refrain from the negligent infliction of
mental distress upon any person in the world. It confronted this possi-
bility of "unmanageable, unbearable and totally unpredictable liabil-
48. See Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975); Barnhill
v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973); Corso v. Merrill, 119
N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Sinn v. Burd, 486
Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975); Lan-
dreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Compare D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping
Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129 (Super. Ct. 1973) ("The language of the Dillon case is...
incorporated herein, since this court is persuaded by the force of the reasoning .. ") with Mc-
Govern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp. 225, 372 A.2d 989 (Super. Ct. 1976) ("It therefore appears...
that Connecticut has not and does not follow the Dillon rule, the decision in D'Amicol. . .to the
contrary notwithstanding").
49. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Burroughs v. Jordan, 224 Tenn. 418, 456 S.W.2d 652 (1970); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116,
259 A.2d 12 (1969).
50. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
51. Id. at -, 472 P.2d at 520.
52. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974) (in which a young boy was allowed to recover for the
negligently-caused death of his step-grandmother which occurred as they were crossing the street).
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ity" in Kelly v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd. 3 In Kelley, the court
refused to allow the plaintiff to recover for the death of a California
man who suffered a fatal heart attack when he was informed of his
daughter and granddaughter's negligently-caused deaths in Hawaii.
Stating that the mere requirement of serious mental distress was not
enough, 4 the court held that his location was too remote from the
scene of the accident. His resulting death was, therefore, not foresee-
able. Because of the unforeseeability, the defendant owed him no duty
and recovery was denied."
Hawaii, once the vanguard in the mental distress tort area, seemed
to be reassessing its position and searching for greater predictability;
the opposite effect often occurring under the more flexible, case-by-case
approach originally championed by Dillon.
IV. DECISION IN MOLIEN
In Molien, the defense initially invoked the three foreseeability
factors of Dillon to show that the emotional reaction of Stephen Molien
was neither foreseeable nor compensable. 6 Viewing Stephen as
merely a third-party bystander to his wife's injury, the defendants were
prepared to argue his distance from the scene of the diagnosis and his
learning of that diagnosis after its occurrence. The Molien court, how-
ever, dismissed this theory entirely by making a crucial factual distinc-
tion between Stephen Molien and the mother in Dillon. Mrs. Dillon
was a witness to the injury of another; Stephen Molien "was himself a
direct victim of the assertedly negligent act."'57 He was not a bystander
to the negligent diagnosis, but a foreseeable victim, thereby rendering
irrelevant the arguments of his lack of proximity and non-contempora-
neous observance.5 8
Having contrasted the two cases, the Molien court nevertheless re-
53. 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975). See generally Note, Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply,
Ltd.: Redefining the Limits to Recoveryfor Negligently InflictedMental Distress, 11 TULSA L.J. 587
(1976).
54. Id. at -, 532 P.2d at 676.
55. Id. at-, 532 P.2d at 677. The Kelley dissent asserted that the majority had taken a step
backward and was once again relying on arbitrary and artificial distinctions regarding liability.
Id. at -, 532 P.2d at 678 (Richardson, C.J., dissenting).
56. See text accompanying note 46 supra. The defense alleged that only the third factor had
been met, given the husband-wife relationship of the plaintiffs.
57. 27 Cal. 3d at 921, 616 P.2d at 815, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
58. Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834. ("[N]o immutable rule can establish the
extent of that obligation for every circumstance in the future.") (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 740, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968)).
[Vol. 16:783
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lied on the general Dillon principle of reasonable foreseeability as de-
fining the defendants' duty and therefore, the scope of the tortious
conduct.5 9 With this basis, the court had little difficulty finding that the
defendants owed a duty of due care to Stephen Molien because the
"reasonable physician" should have foreseen the risk of emotional in-
jury to the husband, given the nature of the disease negligently diag-
nosed.6" With duty, foreseeability and tortious conduct established, the
court then had to decide whether, under California law, the plaintiff
could recover without showing some sort of physical injury.
Prior to this decision, mental distress plaintiffs had to show a phys-
ical manifestation in order to maintain their causes of action. 6' Nearly
one hundred years ago, in Sloane v. Southern California Railway,62 the
California Supreme Court held that mental suffering "constitutes an
aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues from the act com-
plained of," although mental suffering, in itself, could not be actiona-
ble.63 The Molien court cited two principles from Sloane which "still
pervade the law of negligence": 64 that emotional distress recovery must
be limited to parasitic status and that mental distress could be neatly
classified as being either physical or psychological in nature.65 As evi-
dence of the pervasiveness of these concepts, the court stated the then-
59. 68 Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
60. 27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816-17, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35. California treats family
emotional attachments, as well as legal status, as relevant to the determination of foreseeability.
See Mobaldi v. Board of Regents, 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) (held foreseeable
that a foster mother would suffer severe emotional distress upon seeing her foster child become
comatose after receiving a negligently-administered overdose of glucose, where hospital knew of
her relationship to the victim). Note also the status of the false imputation of syphilis as slander
per se. See Yasser, Defamation as a Constitutional Tort: With Actual Malicefor All, 12 TULSA L.J.
601, 605 (1977).
61. See, e.g., Hair v. County of Monterey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975);
Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7 Cal. 3d 884, 892 n.1, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856, 858 n.l, 500
P.2d 880, 882 n.l (1972); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1965).
This requirement of some objective physical symptom corresponds to the currently prevailing
view. See, e.g., Deno v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 126 Ariz. 527, 617 P.2d 35 (1980) (precluding
recovery in the absence of affirmative or intentional wrongdoing by defendant and accompanying
physical injury); Arcia v. Altagracia Corp., 264 So. 2d 865 (Fla. App. 1972); Charlie Stuart Olds-
mobile, Inc. v. Smith, 357 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179
N.W.2d 390 (1970); Carroll v. Lucas, 39 Ohio Misc. 5, 67 Ohio Ops. 2d 104, 313 N.E.2d 864
(1974); Seidenbach's Inc. v. Williams, 361 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1961); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27,
197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 177 N.W.2d 83 (1970). Cf.. Hun-
sley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096, 1102 (1976) ("Whether there is liability for emo-
tional distress unmanifested by any physical symptoms must be determined in another case.").
62. 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896).
63. Id. at 680, 44 P. at 322.
64. 27 Cal. 3d at 924-25, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
65. Id.
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existing law in California, the foundation of which rested on those
principles advanced in Sloane.66
The Molien court first tried to find the policy behind the physical
manifestation requirement. It concluded that the physical manifesta-
tion was "a screening device to minimize a presumed risk of feigned
injuries and false claims."' 67 Referring to the physical injury require-
ment as one of the "artificial barriers, ' 68 the Molien majority was con-
vinced that these "presently existing artificial lines of demarcation"
were not the only appropriate means of avoiding false claims. The ma-
jority criticized the physical injury requirement as being both overin-
clusive and underinclusive, allowing even the most trivial injury to
suffice, yet denying court access to otherwise worthy plaintiffs.69
Following the lead of Hawaii and Rodrigues in abandoning the
need for physical injury, Molien discussed the standard of proof to be
used in future mental distress cases: "where proof of mental distress is
of a medically significant nature" or where the claim is supported by
"some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case."70
Where available, the court notes, objective medical testimony could be
used to substantiate emotional distress claims, but whether or not sus-
ceptible to this testimony, the claim is to be a "matter of proof to be
presented to the trier of fact."'"
Having justified its departure from the earlier cases, the court rec-
66. Id. at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836:
There can be no recovery of damages for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical
injury where such emotional distress arises only from negligent conduct. However, if a
plaintiff has suffered a shock to the nervous system or other physical harm which was
proximately caused by negligent conduct of a defendant, then such plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages for any resulting physical harm and emotional distress.
Id. (quoting BAJI No. 12.80, 6th ed. 1977).
67. 27 Cal. 3d at 925, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836. See Hair v. County of Monte-
rey, 45 Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975); Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 7
Cal. 3d 884, 500 P.2d 880, 193 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1972); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912,
69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115
(1965).
68. 27 Cal. 3d at 926, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836. California has also relied on
other traditional means to guarantee the sincerity of a plaintiff's claim, such as requiring an in-
dependent cause of action other than personal injury, see, e.g., Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins.
Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975); or showing extreme, outrageous and inten-
tional conduct, see, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1970); Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d 628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955); State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952).
69. 27 Cal. 3d at 928-29, 616 P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
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ognized the negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent
cause of action, thereby allowing Stephen Molien to pursue his claim.
V. ANALYSIS
Immediately following its announcement, the Molien decision pro-
voked a wide range of criticism and comment.7 2 Questions ranged
from whether the decision would result in greater justice or chaos, the
ultimate effect on jurisdictions other than California, and whether case-
by-case adjudication of foreseeability would be panacea or placebo.
Molien is not simply a wild card in the hundred-year history of
emotional distress cases. Each trend or test, such as impact, zone of
danger, Dillon, and the requirement of a physical injury, has been an
attempt to answer the same question posed by the court in Molien:
"[t]o what extent should the law permit recovery of damages for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress?"73 Molien is merely another
attempt to provide relief for the truly worthy plaintiff. The problem
with all of the approaches in this area, however, is how the court is to
determine who is indeed "worthy," given the imprecise, intangible na-
ture of the interest sought to be protected. It is a classic example of the
competing policies of tort law, deterring intrusions into the plaintiff's
personal interest, yet correlating the liability of the defendant only to
the extent of the degree of culpability involved.74
In theory, the position taken by the Molien majority is admirable
for its expressed rejection of the traditional mechanical devices such as
the impact rule7" and the zone of danger test.76 Given its desire to
make California what might be termed a "barrier-free" jurisdiction for
emotional distress claims, however, the majority devotes most of its
opinion to what was done in the past and what should not be done.
The extent to which the law should affirmatively allow recovery, how-
ever, remains just as evasive, just as illusive, as before Molien.
Future California cases relying on Molien which involve the negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress will certainly use foreseeability-de-
fined duty as the critical factor in determining liability. If the plaintiff
has suffered an injury to a legally protected interest, recovery will not
be based on such former requirements as impact, physical manifesta-
72. Nat'l L.J., Sept. 8, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
73, 27 Cal. 3d at 918-19, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
74, See PROSSER, supra note 4, at 23.
75. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra.
76. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
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tion or zone of danger. Molien sees these devices as invalid, mechani-
cal controls used by courts to justify fears which the Mollen majority
finds outmoded: (1) the fear of floodgate litigation; (2) the possibility
of feigned claims; and, (3) unlimited liability for defendants. Propo-
nents of Molien will first point out that increased litigation, while not a
valid reason for denying protection to recognized interests, 7 has not
overwhelmed the courts in the post-Dillon years with an overabun-
dance of emotional distress claims.78 In addition, advances in medical
knowledge, unknown to prior generations, have provided new means
by which emotional injury may be measured and evaluated. Future
medical testimony will shift from having to define what is a "physical"
injury,79 to the availability of objective evidence or corroboration to
validate the severity of the distress claimed. 0
The fear that defendants in emotional distress cases will be sub-
jected to potentially unlimited liability cannot be so easily allayed.8'
The failure of the Molien majority to answer its own question of the
extent of liability raises serious doubts about how juries are to be
guided in their assessment of a claim. While determinations of "rea-
sonable foreseeability" will be the province of the court, 2 the determi-
77. It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a
"flood of litigation;" and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any
court ofjustice to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court too much work
to do.
Prosser, supra note 17, at 877.
78. See Comment, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in Cali-
fornia and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248, 1250 (1974); Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander-Recent Developments, 30 MERCER L. REV. 735, 742
(1979).
79. See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text.
80. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y. 2d 609, 613, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556, 249 N.E.2d 419
(1969), in which the court stated, "Mental traumatic causation can now be diagnosed almost as
well as physical traumatic causation." But cf. 27 Cal. 3d at 935, 616 P.2d at 825, 167 Cal. Rptr. at
843 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("No empirical evidence exists that psychiatrists and jurors have since
become better equipped to evaluate the traumatic effect of psychic stimuli."); Smith, Relation of
Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 212 (1944) (warning that an "eagerness to be
progressive may cause extravagant credulity and injury to scientific standards of proof'). See
generally Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497 (1922);
Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 586 (1963); see also Can-
tor, supra note 8, at 435 ("very rarely today can a malingerer recover damages").
81. Accord, Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300, 305 (1979) ("[t]he most convincing
policy reason and the one most often mentioned is the threat of unlimited and burdensome liabil-
ity if the courts permit recovery.") (quoting Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728
(1968)).
82. 27 Cal. 3d at 922, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834 ("Such reasonable foreseeability
. . . contemplates that courts on a case-by-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide
what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen. The courts
thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected.") (quoting Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968)). Seegeneraly Comment,
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nation of whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct caused
the emotional distress is to be left to the jury. With reasonable foresee-
ability established, jurors will be asked to rely on their own experiences
to assess whether there is "some guarantee of genuineness in the cir-
cumstances of the case."83 The highly subjective nature of this evalua-
tion is in contrast to former questions of impact or whether the plaintiff
was in a zone of danger. While some may cite this shift in responsibil-
ity as being the death knell for outmoded policy-based barriers, others
may see it as an open door to unpredictable and potentially unlimited
liability, where no definitions remain for the scope of tortious conduct.
Even as Molien may be placed on the general Dillon continuum in
its fairness-to-plaintiff underpinnings, the majority summarily dis-
missed the need to apply Dillon's three-factor requirement84 to Stephen
Molien. The majority found Stephen to be a direct victim of the tor-
tious conduct, and not a mere bystander. Yet, this distinction becomes
blurred to the point of non-existence elsewhere in the opinion. The
majority refers to cases of third-party bystander recovery to support its
position, yet did not forthrightly discuss whether or how a future plain-
tiff's status as a bystander should be taken into account in an emotional
distress context.85 Was Stephen Molien judicially sidestepped into be-
ing a "direct" victim, thereby avoiding Dillon's three-factor scrutiny
which he could not have overcome?86
It is the spectre of unlimited liability which provokes the dissent of
Justice Clark. With Justice Richardson concurring, he states that the
majority has allowed, "for the first time-a money award against one
who unintentionally disturbs the mental tranquility of another."87
Within the framework of this single decision, the battle lines are once
One Step Beyond the Zone of Danger Limitation Upon Recovery for the Negligent Infliction of
Mental Distress, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 59, 62 (1969).
83. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (citing with approval Rodrigues
v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, -, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970)).
84. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
85. Justice Clark cautions that "the majority cannot escape the Dillon requirement that even
though foreseeable, emotional trauma must result from physical injury to another." 27 Cal. 3d at
934 n.1, 616 P.2d at 824 n.l, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 n.1 (Clark, J., dissenting).
86. Only the third factor, that of a close relationship with the victim, could have been satis-
fied, had the Dillon bystander analysis been applied to Stephen Molien. Cf Johnson v. State, 37
N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (daughter recovered for emotional distress
sustained when hospital negligently misinformed her that her mother had died. The court, how-
ever, analogized her situation to two exceptions to the general rule of non-recovery; the negligent
transmission by a telegraph company of a message announcing death and the negligent mishan-
dling of a corpse; finding her to be the one to whom the duty was directly owed.).
87. 27 Cal. 3d at 933, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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again drawn in century-old fashion. Justifying the traditional, pre-
Molien, California approach, Justice Clark refers to the commonplace
nature of psychic disturbances, the problem with their objective mea-
surement and legislative prerogative in the creation of new causes of
action."8 Fearing, as did the dissent in Dillon, that California courts
were entering a "fantastic realm of infinite liability,"8 9 Clark
prophesizes that the Molien majority has managed to "overstretch the
new elasticity proclaimed by the Dillon majority."9 0
Where the majority treated the requirement of physical injury as a
"barrier,"9 the dissent deems it a "safeguard,"92 preventing juror
abuse, whose judgment is thought to be less reliable when the defend-
ant's conduct has been less than intentional, extreme and outrageous. 93
Commenting further on the appropriateness of punishing the negligent
conduct of the physician, Clark asserts that "the imposition of liability
is far disproportionate to the degree of culpability" 94 and that it is soci-
ety which will bear the cost "by sanctioning claims for hurt feelings."9
But even with the expressed concerns over the rejection of the physical
manifestation requirement, there is a perceptible trend in other juris-
dictions away from impact and zone of danger, into the case-by-case
88. See also Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, 22 Cal. 3d 508, 523-28, 585
P.2d 851, 860-63, 150 Cal. Rptr. 1, 10-13 (1978) (setting forth the policies and philosophies of
Justices Clark and Richardson, dissenting therein as in Molien).
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 934, 616 P.2d at 824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting) (quoting
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 744, 441 P.2d 912, 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 88 (1968) (Burke, J.,
dissenting)). This quote is actually attributable to the majority opinion in Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513, 525, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 45 (1963).
90. 27 Cal. 3d at 924, 616 P.2d at 823, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 841 (Clark, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 926, 616 P.2d at 818, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
92. Id. at 934, 616 P.2d at 824, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 842 (Clark, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (referring to the majority's reliance on Siliznof).
94. See Amaya Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 315, 379 P.2d 513, 525,29 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 45 (1963); Bauer, The Degree of Moral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA.
L. REv. 586 (1933).
95. 27 Cal. 3d at 936, 616 P.2d at 825, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (Clark, J., dissenting). In a
footnote to his dissent, Justice Clark stated that the net effect of the judgment was to permit
recovery for what actually amounted to a negligent alienation of affections, a cause no longer
recognized in California. Id. at 936 n.3, 616 P.2d at 825 n.3, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 843 n.3. The
general sentiments of Justice Clark are paralleled by the dissent in Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 688 (Pa.
1979):
Here, if there is no reasonable measure of plaintiff's pain, then any recovery will be
essentially speculative. Then, too, the nature of our society requires each of us a remark-
able degree of fortitude. It is not unreasonable to draw the line between that degree
which is required and that which is not by reference to that emotional distress which
causes serious physical injury or harm. And it cannot be denied that if not the genuine-
ness, then at least the intensity and thus the nature of the injury, may be difficult to assess
where it causes no physical injury.
.d. at 672 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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foreseeability evaluation of Dillon. This liberalization, coupled with
recent medical advances, will make it increasingly difficult for courts to
justify any of the existing, arbitrary, prerequisites to recovery.
VI. CONCLUSION
The development of emotional distress law has been described as
varying from "the spirit of extreme caution to hesitant experimenta-
tion."96 The first mental distress cases brought with them a plethora of
fears and predictions of future problems, for which arbitrary and
mechanical tests were designed. Such requirements as physical impact,
zone of danger and outrageous conduct have proven to be unwieldy,
with often inequitable results. In Dillon, the California Supreme Court
departed from the still-prevailing zone of danger test. Molien, in abol-
ishing the physical injury requirement, represents an even further de-
parture. In order to pursue a cause of action, all that an emotionally
distressed plaintiff must show is that the injury was reasonably foresee-
able and that the resulting distress was serious. Having abolished the
physical injury requirement, California must now rely on juror judg-
ment and on such words as "foreseeability" and "genuineness" to place
limitations on a defendant's liability.
Is the recognition of a new tort for the negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, in the words of Justice Clark, merely creating "new con-
sequences for old acts" 97 and a step into the "fantastic realm of infinite
liability"98 as prophesied by the dissenters in Dillon? Acceptance of the
Mollen standards will most certainly be hindered by its failure, once
again, to define the extent to which a negligent defendant can be held
liable. But by placing Molien on the historical continuum of emotional
distress law, the trend is clear. The artificially-created barriers to re-
covery for the negligent infliction of emotional distress are being dis-
mantled. Given the century-old fears surrounding the recognition and
later protection of this interest, it is not surprising that this process is
proceeding at less than a revolutionary rate. But the direction is unfail-
ingly toward the application of traditional negligence principles, with
the concepts of duty, breach, causation and injury, unfettered by addi-
tional requirements. The consequence for the "old acts" is by no
96. Goodhart, Shock Cases andArea of Risk, 16 MOD. L. REv. 14, 14 (1953).
97. 27 Cal. 3d at 937, 616 P.2d at 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 844 (Clark, J., dissenting).
98. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 744, 441 P.2d 912, 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 88 (1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).
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means a new one; Molien merely representing a further step toward
classic negligence analysis for emotional distress claims.
Jane F Warmack
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